New World Order – Are the Rules of Nuclear Deterrence Changing?

Vladimir Putin is brandishing a nuclear threat, China is increasing its arsenal, while America is now advocating an "integrated deterrent".

The January 2022 joint statement by five “nuclear-armed” states, including Russia, that “a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,” was a reassuring promise, even if India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea did not sign it.

It seems to be coming up against another reality.

Nuclear deterrence has once again become an instrument of power, whether for Vladimir Putin's Russia, which is brandishing the threat or for China, which is rearming. Beijing's arsenal could reach 700 warheads by 2027 and even 1,000 by 2030.

“All states with nuclear weapons are increasing or improving their arsenals and many are sharpening nuclear rhetoric and the role of nuclear weapons in their military strategies,” the Swedish Sipri Institute warned in its June 2022 report.

Will the doctrines of deterrence, which dictate the conditions of use of nuclear weapons, have to change?

What are the foundations of strategic dialogue?

For all states with nuclear weapons, deterrence is an art that combines “transparency” and “ambiguity.” Transparency on capabilities, to be credible, ambiguity on their use, to maintain doubt in the adversary on the “threshold” from which a conflict could take on a nuclear dimension. Each country defines its rules by maintaining the vagueness of the exact definition of the “vital interests” covered by its deterrence.

Deterrence must discourage any adversary, from the pain of running the risk of a destructive retaliation and of being inflicted with “absolutely unacceptable damage,” in the words chosen for example in the French doctrine.

These rules may also cover the threat of the use of so-called “tactical” strikes, i.e. of limited scope. Tactical weapons are not meant to trigger a global response, but to expand the list of military options, or even allow for a logic of “escalation for de-escalation.”

Russian doctrine has for several years envisaged the use of nuclear weapons in response to conventional threats. Reciprocal deterrence relies on rationality to control escalation. Its “grammar” has codes that experts know how to decipher, from military exercises to putting nuclear forces on alert. The technical capabilities of strategic forces (ability to arm bombs, to conduct raids or underwater patrols ...) are the basis of the credibility of deterrence.

Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, this grammar has been respected without crossing any limits.

Does the war in Ukraine put nuclear deterrence to the test?

The threshold for the use of nuclear weapons may have changed historically depending on the context or conventional capabilities. Vladimir Putin's aggressive rhetoric does not in itself imply a change in posture. “There is, first of all, a prestige reason in these statements: to remind people that Russia is a nuclear power,” explains Heather Williams, director of the program on nuclear issues at the American institute CSIS. “It's also a message to the West that they are more comfortable with the risk than we are,” she continued.

No one knows what Putin's limit is: do Crimea or Donbas belong to Russia's vital interests? At what point does Western support for Ukraine become a threat to Moscow? If the West does not have answers, its deterrence capacity must adapt. A Russian escalation would not go unanswered, Washington warned. NATO recalled in its Strategic Concept adopted in June 2022 that it too is a “nuclear alliance.”

But this extended deterrence does not concern Ukraine. It does not prevent Russia from blackmailing its invasion, posing difficulty for the logic of reciprocal deterrence.

“During the Cold War, escalation was seen as a consequence of misunderstandings or misperceptions” between powers, says Heather Williams of CSIS. “In the future, we may be faced with adversaries who may seek escalation,” she said. Westerners need to work on “escalation management,” she said. That may mean accepting some risk. “However, our greatest asset against Putin is the unity of the Western camp,” she warned.

Any discussion of the risk involved can open up gaps. In the West, the pressure to delegitimize the use of nuclear weapons has also increased with the mobilization of supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The West runs the risk of “self-dissuading.”

How is America responding to the dual threat of Russia and China?

The United States is careful to keep its strategic dialogue under control. Washington has twice deprogrammed a Minuteman III nuclear missile test launch: in March 2022, so as not to inflame tensions with Russia, then in August 2022 to appease China afNancy Pelosi visited Taiwan.

During the Cold War, the American deterrent was tailor-made to counter Russia.

The American deterrent must now take into account two adversaries of equal strength. China has for the moment enshrined in its doctrine the principle of “no first use.” But the modernization of its arsenal, by offering more options, increases the pressure to question the principle. The prospect of a major crisis around Taiwan could lead Beijing to review its doctrine. And in turn, that of the United States.

Doctrine changes began several years ago. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), commissioned by President Donald Trump, sent a signal to Russia and China that there would be no unpunished tactical weapons use. The new March 2022 NPR continues these thoughts. But the questions surrounding the notion of “integrated deterrence” introduced in the official American documents have not yet been answered.

According to various interpretations, it is an attempt to bring together all the “military, diplomatic or economic” instruments that can contribute to the deterrence of an adversary. This integrated defense also aims to involve America’s allies.

Are the other powers adapting?

In a context where China is arming itself and Russia is relying more on its nuclear capabilities, the West cannot afford not to think about this. This began before the war in Ukraine. In Germany, the debate on participation in the allied deterrent has now been taken up by the government. The United Kingdom decided last year to raise the ceiling on its armaments. France, for its part, has not shown any signs of inflection in its doctrine of “strict sufficiency.” But by not being integrated into the NATO doctrine, it assumes to “complicate the adversary's calculations,” says the French army.

Nuclear disinhibition threatens almost every region of the world. North Korea announced last month that it was ready for “preventive strikes” against its enemies. Iran is on the verge of acquiring the bomb, threatening to upset the balance against Israel. In this context, Russian rhetoric risks setting a dangerous precedent.

What future regarding arms control?

Arms control and limitation mechanisms are in a bad way. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, which ended in August 2022, failed to reach a consensus. Russia blocked the adoption of a text mentioning the invasion of Ukraine. The failure, which is above all diplomatic, is however to be put into perspective. The review conferences allow for a follow-up of the commitments of the signatory states. The absence of a final consensus says nothing about the content of the discussions. Arms control is also weakened.

In August 2022, Russia suspended the possibility of inspections of nuclear sites under New Start, the only remaining arms control treaty between Russia and the United States. Moscow claimed an imbalance: Russian inspectors, because of sanctions, were hindered in their movements.

New Start limits Russian and American arsenals to a maximum of 1,550 deployed warheads each and the number of launchers and heavy bombers to 800. It assumes an effort at transparency. The treaty has been extended until 2026. Its successor, if it comes, will not be able to leave China out. But it is too early to consider negotiations. The future of arms control “depends on the outcome of the war in Ukraine,” says Heather Williams of CSIS.

---

Some reading

• The Energy Deadlock in Europe. The problem goes far beyond the war in Ukraine, and Europeans will pay for more than two decades of mistakes by their leaders.

• Elizabeth II: From the British Empire to the Disunited Kingdom. She leaves the throne to Charles III who should take up multiple challenges.

• “Quiet Quitting” Is a Long-standing Phenomenon That Companies Must Address Urgently. Analyzed over the past 50 years, this phenomenon is known as “Employee Withdrawal Behaviors”.

• Xi Jinping’s China Increasingly Weary of Vladimir Putin’s Drawn-Out War. The fact that the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs met, on September 22, 2022, his Ukrainian counterpart, has nothing trivial.

• For the First Time in 30 Years, China Is Growing Slower Than the Rest of Asia. Vietnam benefits in particular from the country’s new attractiveness to multinationals due to Xi Jinping’s inflexible zero-COVID policy.