Information War Between Ukraine and Russia – Putin’s Propaganda Seems Less and Less Effective.

Ukrainians and Westerners are fighting better and better against the Russian propaganda machine in the cyber arena.

The Russian propaganda would jam. In Ukraine, it would not have reached its objectives, according to a document “intercepted” at the beginning of June 2022 by the SBU, the Ukrainian intelligence service. This report would come from the FSB, the Russian service in charge of influence operations. Nothing proves the authenticity of the document, even if the American firm Recorded Future, that is specialized in intelligence and cyber, inclines to believe it according to an analysis published in early July 2022. In the information war, doubt is a weapon. It is a basic tactic for every belligerent.

The informational struggle is the background noise of the war in Ukraine, going far beyond the front lines. Based on a well-established theory and orchestrated in Moscow, it targets the Russian public opinion, which must be convinced of the legitimacy of the war, the Ukrainian society, which must be demoralized, Europe, which must be divided, and the rest of the world, which must disassociate itself from the fight.

Recorded Future has identified several narratives relayed by the Russian media and on social networks to stir up discontent among European societies towards their leaders, to paint a worrying picture of Ukrainian refugees, and to insist on the consequences of sanctions decided against Russia on energy or food supply...

“Attention should be paid to the deterioration of life in the EU,” reads the note attributed to the FSB, analyzed by Recorded Future. “The Russians are trying to divide us,” also emphasizes a military source in Europe, acknowledging that Moscow presses “where it hurts.”

Russia aims to create confusion by multiplying fake news

The goal is not to make people believe in a thesis, but to multiply interpretations and confuse minds.

The Russian influence strategy is based on a mosaic. It has its bridgeheads, with state media such as Russia Today (RT) or Sputnik, whose broadcasting Europe requested to stop at the beginning of March 2022. It also relies on other more permissive media and more discreet and receptive networks to disseminate these messages. The new means implemented are more invasive and convincing. Messages are no longer issued by state agencies but posted on social networks and amplified by others. The level of credibility achieved is much higher. Russia is very active in this field.

In June 2022, while the NATO summit was being held in Madrid, Russian networks focused their efforts on the Spanish-speaking public, as shown in the latest monthly report on Moscow's influence strategy by the Alliance for Securing Democracy, which works under the aegis of the German Marshall Fund to combat disinformation.

The most active pro-Russian accounts have been those of Spanish RT, Spanish personalities “denouncing” an American double game or a new site, “Ahi les va!”, created in April 2022 to relay speeches on the economic consequences of inflation, European divisions and mixing the real and the fake.

The Russian propaganda machine is well oiled, but it is less and less popular in the West

Overall, the Russian audience in the West appears to be stalling.

Whether due to government and corporate restrictions or public fatigue with Russian wartime propaganda, Russian accounts have struggled to maintain their pre-invasion audience, according to most experts on the subject.

Russian influence policy is designed as a military operation. A report published by Microsoft at the end of June 2022 highlighted some of the techniques employed by Moscow in the Ukrainian theater. “Just as malware is patiently pre-positioned in an organization's computer network, Russian cyber influence operations pre-position false narratives in the public domain on the Internet,” the Redmond giant explains.

This tactic allows cyber activities to remain undetected until D-Day. “False narratives that go undetected on the Internet can make later references to those same narratives more credible,” the report continues, citing the example of rumors accusing Ukraine of having developed chemical and bacteriological weapons programs and brandished by Moscow at the start of the offensive.

“This narrative was first posted on YouTube on November 29, 2021” on the account of an “American expatriate based in Moscow,” Microsoft claims. "The story did not attract attention for several months," but on February 24, 2022, “it was sent into battle.” “A team of Microsoft data analysts identified ten Russian news or influencer sites that simultaneously published articles on February 24, 2022, referencing 'last year's report' and seeking to give it credence.”

In the digital flood, it is difficult to trace the thread of rumors. But other examples highlight Russian techniques. Microsoft cites the case of a report from the Russian Permanent Mission published on March 7, 2022, explaining that a hospital in Mariupol had been transformed into a military site. On March 9, 2022, the hospital was bombed. Last April, the Center for Information Resilience told the story of the “Kremlin Washerwoman” report, an anonymous pro-Russian Telegram account followed by 150,000 people.

On February 26, 2022, a 48-page unsigned document was released and presented as a report on Ukrainian crimes. It defends the legitimacy of the Russian intervention. In the following days, it is shared on other Russian networks. Then from March 11, 2022, one finds copies in English, Italian, Arabic, and even Vietnamese, with photos of “exactions” committed by the Ukrainians in the Donbas.

This fake document ends up on right-wing networks where it is sometimes presented as coming from experts of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. From day to day, rumors and manipulations seem to have little effect on the course of the war. But the struggle for influence is built over time. Russia has been betting on the informational dimension of the war for ten years. Faced with manipulation, states are subject to the goodwill of the platforms of action.

The West must regain control so as not to leave Russia alone in the cyber arena

In mid-June 2022, 33 digital players such as Meta, Google, Twitter, and Microsoft, signed the new European code of good practice against disinformation. The Internet is always characterized by its permissiveness. It is its very nature, as well as its economic model, which implies the dissemination of information. The Chinese TikTok, one of the favorite networks of young people, is now in the crosshairs of Westerners. In mid-June 2022, U.S. Senator Steve Daines called the CEO of the Chinese company to underline his “concern that TikTok is allowing the spread of pro-war propaganda”. The legislator will always be one step behind, unfortunately.

To fight the informational war, you have to get into the arena. Hybrid warfare has been considered the war of the bad guys by the Europeans for a long time, but war is not forbidden to anyone. So we have to get into it, even if there are rules to respect. In Ukraine, this is a reality. The authorities in Kyiv are scanning the networks to denounce fake news. They have also learned to occupy the field so as not to let their opponent have the first word.

---

Some reading

• The End of Globalization Is a Unique Opportunity for Europe. Will Europe be able to seize its opportunity and take advantage of the tremendous power that its economy can give it?

• A 180-Degree Turn for Xi Jinping — China Is Making It Easier Again to Lend to Property Developers. The CCP wants to solve the real estate crisis and stop the people’s protest that is starting to rise.

• Abandoned by the World Bank or the UN, Migrants in Africa Are Turning to Bitcoin. Rather than fighting Bitcoin, the powerful in the current system should seek to help the people.