In Addition to the Defeat That Awaits the Russian Army in Ukraine, Putin Is Also Losing Central Asia.

The five "Stans" have distanced themselves from Moscow and sent signals to China and the West.

Due to the Russian war in Ukraine, the five former Soviet republics of Central Asia - Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan - are under tension. Politically and economically.

Despite Russia's aggressiveness in its “near abroad,” and their countries' deep dependence on it, the region's leaders sometimes say, albeit with great care, how much they disapprove of Vladimir Putin's decision to invade Ukraine on 24 February 2022.

A section of opinion in the region also displays its distrust of the former colonial power, which is judged to be increasingly weak in military terms.

How do the governments of the five "Stans" react to the war that Russia is waging in the other former Soviet republic, Ukraine?

Some Central Asian leaders have surprised us by stating their disapproval of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. This has sometimes been very direct. Like on June 17, 2022, on the occasion of the International Economic Forum in St. Petersburg, where the Kazakh president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, had to answer, in front of Vladimir Putin, an embarrassing question: was he ready to recognize the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk, in eastern Ukraine?

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, a career diplomat, avoided the trap: “If the right to self-determination is implemented all over the world, then there will be more than 600 countries instead of the 193 states that are currently members of the United Nations. Of course, that would be chaos.”

But this disapproval was more often said tacitly. By supporting “the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine” (Uzbek Foreign Minister, in March 2022), by explaining that it did not want to oppose the sanctions decreed against Russia since February 2022 (Kazakh position), by telling its citizens that agreeing to join the ranks of the Russian army following the mobilization decreed by the Kremlin was criminal.

These positions displease Moscow. This is hardly mentioned in the Kremlin's declarations, but it arouses the ire of propagandists and other opinion-makers who are often quick to denounce what they consider to be the lack of loyalty of Central Asians.

How do the people of Central Asia look at Russia since February 24, 2022?

The 76 million Central Asians are divided over the war in Ukraine, between those who understand Russia and those who sympathize with Ukraine. But one thing is certain: everyone is concerned.

Firstly, large parts of these companies depend on the income sent back to the country from Russia by migrants, who work on construction sites or in markets. Statistics are hard to come by, but in recent years Russian data show that there are more than 800,000 Tajik citizens in Russia, more than 550,000 Kyrgyz, and 1.7 million Uzbeks. Not counting those who have become Russians in the meantime, nor the illegal ones.

This weighs heavily on the economy of the “Stans.” In 2020, remittances from these workers constituted 31.1% of Kyrgyzstan's GDP and 26.9% of Tajikistan's (more than 40% between 2011 and 2013 for the latter country). These remittances have indeed risen sharply since the beginning of 2022, causing inflation of 16% in the area, but this is due to cyclical factors such as the influx of tens of thousands of Russians in some countries such as Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan.

But beyond these material interests, it is also necessary to take into account the often negative perception of the action of the former Russian colonial power.

In several countries of the region, the few Russians driving around with cars bearing a “Z” - a sign of support for the war in Ukraine - have been freshly welcomed. Elites have sometimes been on edge with the Russian discourse, which led to television personality Tigran Keosayan, husband of chief Russian propagandist Margarita Simonian, being declared persona non grata in Kazakhstan for calling the country “ungrateful” and making threats against it.

“In Central Asia, there is a general resentment towards Russian chauvinism, imperialism, and racism that many Central Asian migrants have experienced in Russia. This is rooted in a long history of colonization, which continues today with Moscow's political domination of the region. Many citizens want to see their country emancipated from Putin's rule,” says sociologist Asel Doolotkeldieva.

How have the war in Ukraine and the sanctions against Russia affected the region's economy?

Beyond the migration issue, the concern of economic actors is the importance of the links between the Central Asian economies and Russia. Moscow, although often overtaken by Beijing, remains a very important trading partner of the “Stans”: Uzbekistan does 13% of its trade with Russia, Kyrgyzstan 11%, and Kazakhstan 10%.

Partly for cyclical reasons such as the increase in commodity prices (which benefits a gas producer like Turkmenistan), Russia has managed to increase its trade with these countries by 13% since the beginning of the war in Ukraine.

There are indications that countries in the Eurasian Economic Union, such as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, could help Russia circumvent the sanctions. But ultimately, this geopolitical turmoil does not please anyone in the region.

Thus, Kazakhstan saw Russian courts take strange decisions at the beginning of the summer of 2022, suspending for “administrative violations” the activity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), the pipeline carrying the production of the Tengiz field in the Caspian Sea, which represents 80% of Kazakh crude exports.

Some saw it as a punishment inflicted by the Kremlin on President Tokayev for having expressed his opposition to the war in Ukraine. “It was mainly a question of Moscow making the American shareholders of Tengiz, Chevron, and ExxonMobil feel what it means to sanction Russia. It was also undoubtedly to help raise world oil prices,” explains an adviser to the Kazakh president.

Who benefits from the Central Asians' distrust of Russia?

More than ever, the Central Asian republics are trying to counterbalance the great powers with each other. And this is all the more true since Russia no longer plays its role as mediator in the region, which is perhaps one of the reasons that led to the aggravation of the border clashes between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan in September 2022, these clashes having caused a hundred deaths.

The necessary balancing act is delicate for authoritarian, even dictatorial regimes, on the one hand, reluctant to bend to Western democratic demands, and on the other hand suspicious of China, perceived through the prism of the “yellow peril.”

The Chinese president's visit in mid-September 2022 to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan (which hosted the annual summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization) somewhat reassured his hosts.

In Astana, Xi Jinping issued a thinly veiled warning to Vladimir Putin: “We will continue to firmly support Kazakhstan in defending its independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity,” he said.

Some people wanted to see in this, undoubtedly forcing the issue a little, a major change in regional security, which until now has been ensured by Russia. “But the West remains a key partner in this delicate moment,” assures the Kazakh president's advisor. “The support given to Kyiv by the Americans and Europeans also impresses in the steppes of Central Asia.”

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