Faced With the Superiority of the Russian Army, Can Ukraine Really Win the War?
An attempt to answer this burning question.
“Wars are unpredictable, and no one can say with certainty when and how this war will end.”
— Jens Stoltenberg
After the victory of some and then others were predicted, the outcome of the conflict is considered uncertain by military observers. They have drawn the first lessons of the fighting.
On February 24, 2022, the Russian “steamroller” seemed to leave little hope for the Ukrainian forces. But the confrontation presented as David versus Goliath turned out to be more balanced. The blitzkrieg was another of Vladimir Putin's illusions.
Vladimir Putin's forces made many mistakes, and the offensives against Kyiv or Kharkiv failed. So, the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, began to believe that the recapture is possible, supported by international military aid. Ukraine can win, they began to say, without the West agreeing on the meaning of a defeat, a weakening, or a humiliation of Vladimir Putin.
For there to be a victory for one side, the other must accept defeat, willingly or not. This is far from being the case. So, the initial plans have been shelved and other scenarios have been imagined by the staff.
Here are four major questions that we are entitled to ask ourselves after a little more than 3 months of conflict in Ukraine.
Can Russia still achieve its goals?
Since February 24, 2022, Moscow has revised its objectives downwards, at least in the short term. There is no longer any question of toppling Kyiv, installing a puppet government, and bringing the former Soviet Republic back into the Russian zone of influence.
Has Putin abandoned the idea of “denazifying” Ukraine?
For him, the war is not just about territorial issues: ensuring continuity between Crimea and Russia, which he has succeeded in doing by obtaining the surrender of the last resistance fighters in Mariupol. Even if it is a Pyrrhic victory, Putin presents it to his people as the first great military victory in Ukraine.
For many specialists, Vladimir Putin wants to drive the United States out of Europe and the dislocation of NATO. He will pursue his goals with determination. In the face of this threat, NATO has opted for scenarios to strengthen its defense postures. Without giving up its long-term ambitions, the Russian president must adapt to the reality on the ground to avoid a defeat.
The Russian offensive is now concentrated in the Donbas around Sieverodonetsk and Lyssychansk, the priority issue for the days or weeks to come. The Russians are advancing cautiously. They have learned from their initial failures to better coordinate their operations. Sieverodonetsk and Lyssychansk had 200,000 inhabitants before the war, which is half the number of Mariupol, which took three months to fall.
Then, the Russian army will be able to attack the Ukrainian positions in Sloviansk and Kramatorsk. The stakes are as much symbolic as tactical, even if they are geographically limited. By seizing the entire administrative district of Donbas, Vladimir Putin will be able to claim a second success after the capture of Mariupol.
After that, whether Kramatorsk has been taken or the Ukrainians have managed to set up defensive lines, the Russian army will badly need an operational break. Both sides are exhausted, with, according to some Western estimates, already 15,000 dead on each side. The number of wounded is even higher. Units need to regenerate urgently. In the coming weeks, the Russians and Ukrainians will play out the definition of a front line.
How is the war of attrition going in the Donbas?
A “decisive battle” is being fought in the Donbas, according to most military experts. It is being fought with artillery fire. “The balance of power is probably 1:2,” says a military source: two Russian joint forces of 20,000 to 30,000 soldiers each are pitted against five to seven Ukrainian brigades, which represent about 25,000 men.
One-third of the Russian military effort in Ukraine is therefore concentrated in the Donbas.
But the numerical advantage is relative: in military theory, the attacker must have a ratio of 1 to 3 to launch himself in good conditions. The Ukrainians can also protect themselves behind defensive lines that have been consolidated for years. In addition to covered trenches, they have built concrete bunkers, some with blast doors. These lines will be hard to conquer. Artillery is helping to make the Ukrainian defense line less coherent, but the battle is tough.
The Russian forces follow two axes of effort, supported by a railway network that ensures their logistical support. In the north, from Izyum, they are now concentrating their attacks around Lyman. But they will face the difficulty of crossing the Donets River. They have already suffered a defeat in Bilohorivka, revealing a weakness in this complex engineering operation. All rivers are an opportunity to enhance the terrain defensively. The Ukrainians also mined the terrain. The other axis passes to the south through Popasna, where the Russian army progresses in stages.
To win, each side relies on a war of attrition: it is a matter of gradually weakening the opponent by imposing losses and preventing his reinforcements until he gives in. Russians and Ukrainians use artillery in different ways. With its BM21, in particular, the Russian army uses its artillery as massive and non-discriminating fire support to saturate an area. If some precision shots are possible, the stake is more to create a shock, to destroy the adversary positions, before being able to launch the progression of the armored vehicles. The range of the BM21s, with standard ammunition, averages around twenty kilometers.
On the Ukrainian side, the artillery pieces are isolated and hidden, waiting for opportunity shots. Artillery is often combined with a drone to identify a target. After firing, the artillery piece is moved to avoid being fired back at. The range of the M777 delivered by the US Army is 30 or 40 km if the howitzers are equipped with Excalibur ammunition. The French Caesar mobile guns can increase the range by a few more kilometers.
The Ukrainian resistance depends on the Western ability to deliver this equipment. France, for example, has provided a dozen Caesars and the United States 80 M777 howitzers out of the 108 promised. The Ukrainian army initially had 1,800 artillery pieces.
Faced with the Russian push in the Donbas, the Ukrainian army has two options. The first would be to launch a counter-offensive in the region or elsewhere that would mobilize some of the Russian forces or prevent them from supporting the effort. But this scenario is considered unlikely: Ukrainian capabilities have also been worn down after three months of the war. The other option is to retreat to another rear position. But the maneuver is made perilous by Russian artillery fire on major axes. By leaving its positions, the Ukrainian army risks disorganizing its whole device...
To win the battle of Donbas, the Ukrainian army must hold on, to impose losses on Russia. It can also target the opposing logistic lines to slow down its progression.
Will Ukraine be able to regain its lost territories?
Ukrainians are dreaming of victory. With 140,000 active soldiers and a reserve of some 250,000 men, Volodymyr Zelensky's army has enough mass to work out some scenarios. Especially since, with the territorial forces and volunteers, the Ukrainian army claims to have up to 700,000 men. Enough to face Russia, unless the latter decides to mobilize. Vladimir Putin has ruled this out for the moment. However, he has just removed the age limit for enlistment.
Would Ukraine be able to reconquer Kherson, Mariupol, the Donbas, or even Crimea? Beyond declarations of intent, such operations are not very realistic.
In Kherson, the Russian army is organizing defensive lines to establish itself in the long term, notes a military source. Crimea, where the port of Sevastopol is located, belongs to the vital interests of Russia. But the supply of Western military equipment is gradually expanding Ukrainian possibilities. If the Ukrainian army has demonstrated defensive qualities, conducting counter-offensives is more difficult, without the support it lacks.
In the Kharkiv region, Ukrainian forces have regained ground thanks to the voluntary withdrawal of Russians from fragile positions. Once Moscow has declared an end to the high-intensity war, the positions will probably become more territorial.
But a pause does not mean the end of the fighting, let alone the war. Once the territories up to Kherson have been annexed, Russia may consider targeting Odesa. Depriving Ukraine of a maritime outlet will weaken it economically in the long term. And, by keeping up the pressure, it forces the West to support Ukraine financially, to the point of hoping for a rupture between Europeans.
On their side, the Ukrainian forces can continue their strategy of harassment, without accepting the territorial loss suffered. Economic sanctions and losses on the ground challenge Russia to sustain the war.
What are the risks of escalation in this war between Ukraine and Russia?
In the absence of success on the ground, there remains an option for the Kremlin autocrat: an escalation to which Ukrainian forces could not respond. The Russian army can first decide to use new equipment. It has begun to do so with Kinjal hypervelocity missiles. It has also deployed its new BMPT Terminator tanks. But this equipment reveals a weakness in available equipment (missiles or tanks) rather than a change in tactics. Conversely, to support its positions in the south, Russia has used 50-year-old T62 tanks.
Russia has also used incendiary ammunition in the Donbas to destroy Ukrainian defenses. Faced with this escalation, Kyiv is demanding new weapons from the West, such as Himars missile launchers with a range of 300 km or M270 multiple rocket launchers with a range of 80 km. Within NATO, some allies are considering excluding certain weapons from their deliveries to avoid an escalation or an extension of the fighting on Russian territory.
If the Russian army were to find itself in difficulty or threatened with defeat, Moscow could decide to escalate the situation to stop the fighting. Could non-standard weapons be mobilized? Chemical weapons? Banned from the battlefield, their use could create a shock of terror in public opinion. But the tactical gain in open terrain would be limited. Russian forces would be exposed to potential headwinds that would affect them. International condemnation, on the other hand, would be massive and potentially trigger a response, as NATO leaders had implied.
The other weapon is nuclear. The political consequences would be even stronger, in line with the taboo that would have been broken. At that price, would a so-called tactical strike, i.e., a small one, be of any interest?
Several options were available to Putin, with different consequences: choosing a symbolic target, a strictly military one, or one involving civilians. However, powerful weapons are not magic weapons. The Ukrainians have learned to disperse their forces. A tactical nuclear strike, however devastating, would not necessarily mean the disappearance of the Ukrainian military potential. Not to mention the risk of a Western retaliation, this scenario would mean failure for everyone, including Vladimir Putin. It is considered very unlikely, even if no one can exclude this worst-case scenario.
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